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COMPULSORY CAESAREAN SECTIONS: AN
ENGLISH PERSPECTIVE
Robert Francis QC*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few medical procedures have given rise to such anxiety and debate as
delivety by Caesarean section. It has become something of a battle
ground between feminists, or "pro-choice" opinion, and those claiming to
defend the rights of the unborn child. In physical terms, the clash be-
tween the two points of view could not be more acute, as in many cases it
is quitc! impossible to accommodate both the wishes of the mother to pre-
serve her body from what she perceives as a violation and the survival of
her viable fetus.
Against such a background, it is not surprising that the courts of com-
mon law jurisdictions have been confronted with urgent and difficult
cases resulting in decisions which raise as many questions as they answer
and which are heavily criticised by advocates of competing schools of
thought. Such cases may provide illustrations of the advantages of a com-
mon law system in adapting old methodologies to new problems and the
disadvantages inherent in judicial legislation in the absence of legislative
guidance from elected representatives of society.
The purpose of this Article is not to suggest answers in a field where it
is impossible to satisfy all, but to provide an account of the experience of
courts of England and Wales. It seeks to describe the principles that were
developed in medical decision making before the spate of cases concern-
ing Caesarean sections; give an account of those cases and their judg-
ments; summarise the resulting state of English law; and, finally, to
consider whether society has been well served by this process.
* Robert Francis graduated in law from Exeter University in 1971 and was called to
the Bar of England and Wales in 1973. He was appointed Queen's Counsel in 1992. He
specialises in medical ethical and malpractice law. He has appeared in some of the cases
cited in this Article. This Article retains British spelling and citation form.
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II. AUTHORITY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT
A. Adults
English law adheres to the fundamental legal principle that a person's
body is inviolate unless he consents to, or there is some other legal au-
thority for, the invasion. In general, any form of medical treatment with-
out the patient's consent is unlawful and renders the doctor so acting
liable to prosecution or civil action for assault or trespass to the person.
In England, unlike some other common law jurisdictions, the consent re-
quired may be based on an understanding of the general nature of the
proposed treatment, rather than detailed knowledge of the attendant
risks. Failure to give accurate information of the risks of the procedure
does not invalidate the consent given, even if it may render the doctor
liable for breaching his duty of care by failing to give appropriate
warnings.'
The possibility of an exception, central to the cases to be considered in
this Article, was adumbrated in Re T' where Lord Donaldson of Lym-
ington MR said:
An adult patient who, like Miss T., suffers from no mental inca-
pacity has an absolute right to choose whether to consent to
medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than an-
other of the treatments being offered. The only possible qualifi-
cation is a case in which the choice may lead to the death of a
viable fetus. That is not this case and, if and when it arises, the
courts will be faced with a novel problem of considerable legal
and ethical complexity.3
It should be noted that no suggestion was offered as to a legal basis for
such an exception. There are well-recognised exceptions to the require-
ment for the patient's consent, apart from certain types of treatment for
mental disorder that may be authorised under mental health legislation.
B. Children
Consent to medical treatment performed on a child may be provided
by a person having parental responsibility.4 The courts have statutory
1. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem & Maudsley Hospitals [1985] AC
871 (HL).
2. Re T. (Adult: Reftsal of Treatment) [1993] Faro 95, 102.
3. Id.
4. For this purpose, a child is any person under the age of 18. Consent may also be
given by a child of any age for him or herself if in possession of a sufficient degree of
maturity and understanding. Consent by any party that has the power to do so permits
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and inherent powers to make orders authorising medical treatment. 5
Such decisions must be made in the best interests of the child.
C. Mentally Incompetent Patients
English law is strangely deficient in providing a means for making deci-
sions in cases of adult patients who are mentally incapable of doing so for
themselves or even if otherwise competent, unable to communicate their
decision. Until recently, the position with regard to the treatment of the
mentally incompetent was uncertain. Obviously such treatment was
given, but without any intervention by lawyers and probably without
much thought to its legal basis. Thus, Skegg, writing in 1984, was able to
state: "although it is generally accepted that a doctor is sometimes justi-
fied in proceeding without consent, there is no English case which is di-
rectly on point."6
The most helpful line of authority available at the time was from the
Canadian courts,7 the effect of which was that if treatment was necessary
for the protection of life or the preservation of health, a doctor was justi-
fied in providing treatment, without consent, to adult patients incapable
of consenting for themselves.8
The problem was not addressed by the English courts until T v. 7i and
then lm-ore fully and authoritatively by the House of Lords in Re F.10 It
was discovered that the inherent protective power over incompetent
adults, granted to the courts by virtue of the royal prerogative, had been
withdrawn, possibly under the misapprehension that the matter was now
covered by mental health legislation. Therefore, the court could not
authorise medical treatment in the sense of making lawful that which
would otherwise be unlawful. Furthermore, no relative or other third
party had the power to provide a proxy consent. The House of Lords was
obliged to search for a principle by which treatment and care of the in-
treatment to be given, even if another party disagrees. Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech
Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112, 169-70; Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to
Treatment) [1993] 3 WLR 592.
5. For example, under Children Act 1989 section 100(3) as in Re T (A Mi-
nor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242; Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treat-
ment Cqurt's Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR 758.
6. PDG SKEGG, LAW, ETHICS AND MEDICINE 101 (1984).
7. Marshall v. Curry [1933] 3 DLR 260; Winn v. Alexander [1940] 3 DLR 778; Murray
v. McMurchy [1949] 2 DLR 442; Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital [1970] 17 DLR (3d) 139;
Schweizer v. Central Hospital [1974] 53 DLR (3d) 494.
8. Id.
9. [1988] Fam 52.
10. Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 (HL).
1998]
368 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:365
competent could be legitimated and such a principle was identified' in the
doctrine of necessity. Thus, it was held that where a person is mentally
incompetent or unable to communicate a decision as to treatment, and
will not recover such capacity within time for treatment to restore or pre-
vent a deterioration in health, it is lawful for such treatment to be pro-
vided in the best interests of the patient. Such interests are to be
determined in accordance with responsible and competent medical prac-
tice, and following the test laid down in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Manage-
ment Committee." In other words, if in such a case a doctor decides that
treatment is in the patient's best interests, he may lawfully provide such'
treatment if he acts competently, and no consent Of any third party or the
court is required.
It was recognised, however, that there were cases, such as the sterilisa-
tion of mental patients, where it would be prudent for some form of addi-
tional safeguard to be provided. In the absence of a wardship jurisdiction
or its equivalent, the best that could be devised was the use of the court's
jurisdiction to make declarations. A declaration does not render lawful
that which would otherwise be unlawful, but does provide a mechanism
whereby the court can inquire into whether the decision to treat has been
competent and responsible. There is, however, an inherent limitation in a
procedure that applies the Bolam12 test in this way: where there is more
than one responsible and competent school of thought, it may be lawful
to provide treatment and equally lawful not to do so. The court cannot
then easily choose between the competing opinions.
III. PATIENT AND FETAL RIGHTS IN OBSTETRICS
An obstetrician continually faces the dilemma caused by a perception
of an ethical duty to both the mother and her fetus as separate entities.
The Royal College of Obstetricians' guidelines state that:
The aim of those who care for pregnant women must be to fos-
ter the greatest benefit to both the mother or fetus, and inform
and advise the family, utilising their training and experience in
the best interests of parties. Obstetricians must recognise the
11. [1957] 1 WLR 582. This case laid down the principle that:
[A] doctor who had acted in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as
proper by a responsible body of medical opinion skilled in the particular form of
treatment in question was not guilty of negligence merely because there was a
body of competent professional opinion which might adopt a different technique.
12. Id.
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dual claims of the mother and her embryo or fetus and inform
arid advise the family, utilising their training and experience in
the best interests of both parties.' 3
The legal position in England and Wales has, in general, not recognised
this dual obligation. On several occasions, the courts have refused to
recognise the fetus as having any legal personality giving the court juris-
diction to intervene. Thus, in Paton v. British Pregnancy Advice Service,'
4
a husband was not permitted to apply for an injunction to restrain the
abortion of a fetus of which he was the father. Sir George Baker P was
clear thaat the fetus had no rights:
The first question is whether this plaintiff has a right at all. The
fetus cannot, in English law, in my view, have a right of its own
at least until it is born and has a separate existence from its
mother. That permeates the whole of the civil law of this coun-
try (I except the criminal law, which is now irrelevant), and is,
indeed, the basis of the decisions in those countries where law is
founded on the common law ... there can be no doubt, in my
view, that in England and Wales the fetus has no right of action,
no right at all, until birth.' 5
In C v. S,6 it was held that an unborn child had no locus standi to prevent
an abortion. Heilbron J said:
The authorities, it seems to me, show that a child, after it has
been born, and only then, in certain circumstances, based on he
or she having a legal right, may be a party to an action brought
with regard to such matters as the right to take, on a will or
intestacy, or for damages for injuries suffered before birth. In
other words, the claim crystallises upon the birth, at which date,
but not before, the child attains the status of a legal persona,
and thereupon can then exercise that legal right.17
In Re F,'8 the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to make an unborn
child a ward of court even to protect it from damage likely to be caused
by its mother. This is not to say that acts and omissions during birth may
not have consequences after birth. Thus, the common law recognises that
an action in negligence may be brought by a child once born alive for
13. A Consideration of the Law and Ethics in Relation to Court-Authorised Obstetric
Intervention paras. 4.3.1.-4.3.2. (Royal College of Obstetricians & Gynaecologists, 1996).
14. [1979] QB 276.
15. Id. at 279.
16. [1988] QB 135.
17. Id. at 140 (citing Canadian authorities, Medhurst v. Medhurst [1984] 46 OR (2d)
263; Deliler v. Ottawa Civic Hospital [1979] 25 OR (2d) 748; [1980] 29 OR (2d) 677).
18. Re F (In Utero) [1988] Fain 122.
19981
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injuries inflicted as a result of antenatal acts or omissions. 9 A charge of
homicide will lie against a person for an assault on a pregnant woman
resulting in the death of the child, if initially born alive. Attorney Gen-
eral's Reference No 320 stated:
Murder or manslaughter can be committed where unlawful in-
jury is deliberately inflicted either to a child in utero or to a
mother carrying a child in utero in the circumstances postulated
in the question. The requisite intent to be proved in the case of
murder is an intention to kill or cause really serious bodily in-
jury to the mother, the fetus before birth being viewed as an
integral part of the mother. Such intention is appropriately
modified in the case of manslaughter . . . . The fact that the
death of the child is caused solely in consequence of injury to
the mother rather than as a consequence of injury to the fetus
does not negative any liability for murder and manslaughter
provided that the jury are satisfied that causation is proved.
A similarly ambivalent view is taken by the English legislature. On the
one hand, the Abortion Act 1967 authorises terminations of pregnancy in
a wide range of cases. On the other, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act
1929 prohibits the destruction of any child capable of being born alive.2 '
The Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 clarifies the com-
mon law position in relation to liability to the child born alive for injuries
in utero.
With respect to the mother, the general common law position is clear:
a competent adult patient cannot be forced to submit to medical treat-
ment, however well-intentioned, and however necessary to preserve life
or health.22 Re F23 established that treatment could be given to a patient
incapable of consenting to treatment if it was in the patient's best interest.
How this would be applied in obstetric management was unclear. As will
be seen, the perceived imperative to save life, fetal and maternal, resulted
in what may be considered surprising developments in the definition of
mental capacity and of patients' best interests.
19. Burton v. Islington Health Authority [1993] QB 204 CA.
20. [1996] 2 WLR 412.
21. This is subject to an exception under the Abortion Act 1967 in relation to a fetus
of 24 weeks or more that is likely to be seriously handicapped at birth. ABORTION Acr
1967 section 1 (as amended by the HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY Acr 1990).
22. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem & Maudsley Hospitals [1985] AC
871 (HL).
23. Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 (HL).
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IV. COMPULSORY OBSTETRICS
Unti.l 1988, no case appears to have been brought before the English
courts in which an attempt was made to authorise the imposition of ob-
stetric management on a woman without lawful consent. The extension
of the declaratory jurisdiction24 by the cases of T v. T15 and Re F 2 6 to
include issues of mental capacity and best interests of the patient with a
practical requirement for "sensitive" cases to be referred to court, inevi-
tably set the scene for obstetric cases to be the subject of applications.
A. The Caesare'an Section Cases
While they have provoked considerable controversy, there have in fact
been very few cases in which courts in the United Kingdom have been
asked to consider a proposal to deliver a baby by Caesarean section
against the will of the mother. It might be presumed that before the ad-
vent of the declaratory jurisdiction referred to above, doctors did not
consider it necessary to seek such a safeguard, relying on some form of
medical paternalism to justify their actions. In the case of competent pa-
tients, it is more likely that it did not occur to doctors to perform such
procedures if their persuasive powers failed to convince the patient of the
need for it. In any event, as will be seen from the cases that have come
before the courts, such problems usually arise in circumstances of great
urgency and it may not have been thought practicable to involve the ma-
chinery of justice in addressing the issues. It may be possible that the
ever-increasing threat of litigation arising out of obstetric accidents has
been a powerful motivating force behind the modest flow of cases in this
area.
B. The Mentally Competent Adult Patient In re S (Adult: Refusal
of Treatment)
In re S was the first case brought before the courts to obtain a decla-
24. This extension has been described as "one of the most remarkable developments
of mod,.rn British administrative law." ZAMIR AND WOOLF, THE DECLARATORY JUDG-
MENT 8 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed. 1993).
25. [1988] Fain 52.
26. [1990] 2 AC 1 (HL). See the judgments of Lord Brandon at pp. 56-57, 62-65; Lord
Griffiths at pp. 70-71; Lord Goff at pp. 79-80, 83. The practise is now followed in sterilisa-
tion cases (see Practice Note (Sterilisation: Minors and Mental Health Patients) [1993] 3 All
ER 222) and for the withdrawal of life-sustaining nutrition and hydration (see Airedale
NHS Trust v. Bland 11993] AC 789; Practice Note (Official Solicitor: Vegetative State)
[1996] NLJ 1585).
27. [1993] Fain 123.
1998]
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ration that it would be lawful to perform a Caesarean section delivery on
a woman in labour. The circumstances in which the case was brought
were extraordinary and unlikely to produce reasoned jurisprudence. A
thirty-year-old woman was in labour with her third pregnancy, being six
days overdue with the fetus in a transverse lie and a fetal elbow project-
ing through the cervix. For deeply held religious reasons, the mother re-
fused to consent to delivery by Caesarean section, although she had been
advised and understood that without such a procedure she and the baby
were in mortal danger. An application was made to the court by the hos-
pital for a declaration that nonconsensual surgical delivery would be law-
ful. The mother was not represented, but the court was assisted by an
amicus curiae. The judge, Sir Stephen Brown, President of the Family
Division, has described what occurred in a lecture:
During the luncheon adjournment .... my clerk came to me and
said 'I think there is an application which somebody wishes to
make about a caesarean section operation. I don't know any-
thing about it.' It was 1:20pm or just after by the time I got in
touch with [the Official Solicitor28] and by 2:10pm he had
briefed counsel, a QC, in court. I had nothing except the form
of summons, which had been issued by the health authority...
seeking a declaration that it would be lawful for the doctors to
carry out a caesarean section operation on a 30 year old woman
who was in the last stages of labour with her third pregnancy.
The consultant gynecologist gave oral evidence before me...
this lady had a genuine religious objection to a caesarean section
being carried out; this was a desperate situation, the fetus was
lying in a position where it was nearly emerging, and if there was
no intervention-and there was no doubt about it-the mother
would die and also the child .... The question was, should that
be allowed? . . .. . It was very clear-this was minutes, not
hours-both would die. I heard very helpful submissions by
counsel for the Official Solicitor and I made the ... declaration,
telling the consultant 'please go to my clerk's room and use the
telephone:' it was as vital as that.29
According to the report of the case, the judgment was delivered at 2:18
pm The judge noted that there was no English authority on the point,
28. The Official Solicitor is an officer of the court amongst whose duties is to assist the
court as amicus curiae or on occasions to represent parties unable to represent themselves,
such as children or mental patients.
29. Matters of Life and Death (Lecture to the Medico-Legal Society, Oct. 14, 1993) 62
MED. LEG. J. 52 (1994).
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although it had been said that it might be possible to override the will of a
competent woman to save a viable fetus. 30 However, he considered there
was American authority suggesting that in a case like this the American
courts would be likely to favour the grant of a declaration. He then
granted a declaration according to the following terms:
It is declared that the operation of caesarean section and neces-
sary consequential treatment which the Plaintiff, by its servants
or agents proposes to perform on the Defendant at [hospital] is
in the vital interests of the Defendant and the unborn child she
is carrying and can lawfully be performed despite the Defend-
ant's refusal to give her consent.
31
The aftermath of the case was described by an obstetrician who had been
on duty in the labour ward:
Well, of course there was chaos. I think that it was understood
that the wording [of the declaration] was to save the life of the
mother and the baby.., but what happened was that the baby
died during the court hearing.., they got the phone call saying
'It:; been agreed,' which was completely startling, because every-
one was saying, 'There is no law on which you can bet,' and the
woman was wheeled down the corridor, [w]ith the husband say-
ing, 'What's happening?,' and they said 'Oh, we've got the
agreement of the court,' and they said 'Well, what about human
rights?,' and they said 'Oh, don't know about that.' They were
completely dazed . . . they are African and not aware of the
system, not aware of their rights, unrepresented in the court
when the decision was made .... If this hadn't happened, the
baby would have died and we would have renegotiated with the
woman: 'Now, look, the baby has died and it's not going to
come out. Can we now do a caesarean section?,' and she would
still have refused; and she would have died without [the] court
order, I am sure of that.32
The same doctor described the subsequent reaction to these events of the
participants:
A long time later people who were working in the hospital had
not recovered from the incident, the staff, let alone the lady in
question . . . the mother felt that God was acting through the
agency of the gynecologist, and that is how she has forgiven him
for this incident, and how she has ended up explaining it. That is
30. Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 102.
31. The text is taken from the official transcript, as it does not appear in the report.
32. Matters of Life and Death, supra note 30, at 65.
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how she has interpreted it now and that is why no appeal has
come through. As far as the obstetricians are concerned, I think
we are deeply divided about this. Having understood that our
duty is to the baby through the mother, we don't quite like this
idea of maternal/fetal conflict, because the vast majority of our
work is done with the mothers and through the mothers, and the
idea we can breach confidentiality and then go to make applica-
tions to divide mothers and children legally, when we can't di-
vide them physically, is actually an anathema to many.
Faced with only minutes to decide an unprecedented case, the judge's
reaction was wholly understandable: he acted to save the lives of the
mother and baby. Yet, partly for the reasons expressed by the doctor
quoted above, the case had many unsatisfactory features. The case found
it lawful for doctors to override the clearly expressed will of a mentally
competent woman and to perform invasive surgery. While time did not
permit a reasoned judgment, it is clear that the justification cannot have
been any perceived irrationality of the decision: there was and remains
binding House of Lords authority holding that a competent adult has an
absolute right to choose whether or not to undergo medical treatment:
"If the doctor making a balanced judgment advises the patient to submit
to the operation, the patient is entitled to reject that advice for reasons
which are rational or irrational-or for no reason." 33
The President relied on the American case of In re AC14 as authority
for the proposition that the American courts would have granted a decla-
ration in similar circumstances. Unfortunately, a study of this case sug-
gests the precise opposite. A trial court judge had granted an order, after
an urgent hearing at the hospital, authorising a Caesarean section on a
woman terminally ill with cancer in an attempt to save her baby. This was
despite such a procedure being against her apparent wishes and the fact
that the operation might shorten her life. The motions division of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused a stay. After the opera-
tion, the baby survived only a few hours, and the mother died two days
later. The Court of Appeals then ordered the case to be heard en banc.
On this occasion, it vacated the order of the trial judge on the ground that
the substituted judgment procedure should have been followed. The
court strongly suggested that the will of a mentally competent woman
should never be overridden. The court, en banc, held that it would have
33. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem & Maudsley Hospitals [1985] AC
871 (HL) at p. 666 per Lord Templeman.
34. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
Compulsory Caesarean Sections
been improper to presume that a patient was incompetent.35 It supported
two further arguments against overriding the patient's objections: first, it
destroys the necessary trust between patient and doctor, and might drive
high-risk mothers out of the health care system; and second, in this type
of case, the urgency renders justice almost impossible to achieve 36 (for
reasons that applied even more cogently in Re S itself):
[A]ny judicial proceeding in a case such as this will ordinarily
take place-like the one before us here-under time constraints
so pressing that it is difficult or impossible for the mother to
communicate adequately with counsel, or for counsel to organ-
ize an effective factual and legal presentation in defense of her
liberty and privacy interests and bodily integrity. Any intrusion
implicating such basic values ought not to be lightly undertaken
when the mother is not only precluded from conducting pre-trial
discovery... but also is in no position to prepare meaningfully
for trial. As one commentator has noted "The procedural short-
comings rampant in these cases are not mere technical deficien-
cies. They undermine the authority of the decisions themselves,
posing serious questions as to whether judges can, in the ab-
sence of genuine notice, adequate representation, explicit stan-
dards of proof, and right of appeal, realistically frame principled
and useful legal responses to the dilemmas with which they are
being confronted., 37
In a passage cited by Sir Stephen Brown P, the court stated:
We emphasize, nevertheless, that it would be an extraordinary
case indeed in which a court might ever be justified in overriding
the patient's wishes and authorizing a major surgical procedure
such as a Caesarean section. Throughout this opinion we have
stressed that the patient's wishes, once ascertained, must be fol-
lowed 'in virtually all cases'.. . unless there are 'truly extraordi-
nary or compelling reasons to override them'. . . . Indeed some
may doubt that there could ever be a situation extraordinary or
compelling enough to justify a massive intrusion into a person's
body, such as a Caesarean section against that person's will.
Whether such a situation may someday present itself is a ques-
tiion we need not strive to answer here.38
Therefore, the decision was hardly a ringing endorsement of compulsory
Caesarean sections. However, it is only right to point out that the court
35. Id. at 1247.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1248.
38. Id. at 1252 (emphasis supplied).
1998]
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in In re AC expressly declined to overrule an earlier decision in the same
jurisdiction, In re Madyun,39 in which a trial court judge authorised a
Caesarean section on the ground that the State's interest in protecting a
viable fetus, which could be delivered safely, overrode the mother's rights
to make a choice in accordance with her religious beliefs.4" Further, it
might be said that in In re Madyun there was no "real" conflict between
mother and fetus in that delivery was necessary to save both lives,
whereas in In re AC the operation was actually detrimental to the
mother's prospects of survival. Nonetheless, such reasoning did not dis-
suade the court from the strong expression of principle cited above.41
Re S was the subject of considerable academic42 and feminist 4 3 criti-
cism. A competent adult's refusal of invasive surgery had been overrid-
den partly in the interests of her fetus (until it died), and partly in her
own interests. What was required in those interests was determined by
others. This momentous step was taken without any representation on
her behalf, and with only the most rudimentary evidence. Insofar as the
decision was taken to protect the interests of the fetus, it would seem to
have conflicted with the powerful obiter dictum of Balcombe U in Re F "44
If the law is to be extended in this manner, so as to impose con-
trol over the mother of an unborn child, where such control may
be necessary for the benefit of that child, then under our system
of parliamentary democracy it is for Parliament to decide
whether such controls can be imposed and, if so, subject to what
limitations or conditions .... If Parliament were to think it ap-
propriate that a pregnant woman should be subject to controls
for the benefit of her unborn child, then doubtless it will stipu-
late the circumstances in which such controls may be applied
and the safeguards appropriate for the mother's protection. In
such a sensitive field, affecting as it does the liberty of the indi-
vidual, it is not for the judiciary to extend the law.45
39. Id. at 1259.
40. Id.
41. The family of AC sued for malpractice in a suit settled on terms that included a
statement endorsed by the AMA and ACOG, including the following: "[a] judicial pro-
ceeding is the least desirable manner to obtain authorization for treatment and should be
utilized only in the absence of other surrogates .... Judicial authorization to override a
patient's competent decision is virtually never justified." Barbara Hewson, Mother Knows
Best, 142 NEW LAW JOURNAL 1538, 1545 (1992).
42. See commentary by Ian Kennedy & Andrew Grubb, Treatment Without Consent, 1
MED. L. REV. 92 (1993).
43. See Hewson, supra note 42, at 1538.
44. Re F (In Utero) (Wardship) [1988] 2 All ER 193.
45. Id. at 200-01.
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Following this case, the Royal College of Obstetricians issued guidelines46
that concluded by suggesting a practice of respecting the competent
mother's wishes in these circumstances:
A doctor must respect the competent pregnant woman's right to
choose or refuse any particular recommended course of action
whilst optimising care for both mother and fetus to the best of
his or her ability. A doctor would not then be culpable if these
erdeavours were unsuccessful. We conclude that it is inappro-
priate, and unlikely to be helpful or necessary, to invoke judicial
intervention to overrule an informed and competent woman's
refusal of proposed medical treatment, even though her refusal
might place her life and that of her fetus at risk.47
It was considered that resort to law to overturn the presumption in favour
of patient autonomy created more problems than it solved.48
V. THE MENTALLY ILL PATIENT: TAMESIDE & GLOSSOP AcUTE
SER VICES NHS TRUST V. CP 9
After an interval of over three years, the Family Division was called
upon in circumstances of slightly less urgency to consider the case of a
female paranoid schizophrenic who was compulsorily detained in a
mental hospital under section three of the Mental Health Act 1980.50
This is not the place for a detailed examination of a domestic mental
health statute, but it should be noted that detention under it does not
carry any necessary implication that the patient has lost the mental capac-
ity to consent to or refuse medical treatment.51 The patient wanted to
have her baby and care for it, but suffered from a delusional belief that
the doctors caring for her were evil and wished to harm the baby. She
had a history of resisting treatment. The treating doctors became con-
cerned at intra-uterine growth retardation and concluded that delivery by
Caesarean section was necessary to safeguard the baby. They feared that
the palient, whom they considered incapable of understanding the advice
she received, would resist. They sought a declaration that it would be
lawful to provide such treatment and to use reasonable restraint to the
extent necessary for that purpose.
46. A Consideration of the Law and Ethics in Relation to Court-Authorised Obstetric
Intervenion, supra note 14, at paras. 4.3.1.-4.3.2.
47. d. at paras. 5.11-5.12.
48. (d. at para. 4.5.8.
49. -1996] FLR 762.
50. 1d.
51. See B v. Croydon Health Authority [1994] 22 BMLR 13.
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An inter partes hearing took place with the patient represented by
counsel, instructed by the Official Solicitor acting as guardian ad litem for
the patient. Oral evidence was heard from the responsible psychiatrist
and obstetrician. It was common ground that the evidence proved the
patient to be mentally incompetent in accordance with the test formu-
lated for medical cases in Re C52 in which Thorpe J defined the necessary
ingredients of competence for this purpose to be (1) the ability to com-
prehend and retain treatment information; (2) the ability to believe that
information; and (3) the ability to weigh the information in the balance
and arrive at a choice.
The judge was prepared to declare that it was lawful at common law to
provide the appropriate treatment to this incompetent patient because it
was in her best interests. However, he hesitated to do that because of an
uncertainty about whether the common law permitted the use of restraint
for this purpose, given that the legislature had made detailed provisions
for the detention of mental patients and for the protection of civil liberty
in this context. He therefore considered whether the legislation permit-
ted such treatment to be given without the patient's consent. He con-
cluded that section sixty-three of the Mental Health Act 198313 permitted
a Caesarean section to be imposed on the patient without her consent on
the grounds that it was treatment for the mental disorder from which she
was suffering. The evidence before him showed that without surgical de-
livery the fetus would die, but the mother would suffer no physical harm.
However, the birth of a stillborn baby would have had a profound delete-
rious effect on her mental health and would have impeded her recovery.
This interpretation of the statute is controversial,54 but there would
seem to be a pragmatic argument in favour of it in this type of case.
Based upon the evidence, the mother wished to protect her baby, but by
reason of her serious mental disorder, believed that the very act which
would save it was intended to do it harm. If such a patient cannot be
52. [1994] 1 WLR 290, 295.
53. "The consent of a patient shall not be required for any medical treatment given to
him for the mental disorder from which he is suffering... if the treatment is given by or
under the direction of the responsible medical officer." It had previously been established
that this section could justify the force-feeding of an anorexic patient or one suffering from
a self-harming personality disorder as being treatment for the disorder. B v. Croydon
Health Authority [1995] Farn 133.
54. Andrew Grubb, 4 MED. L. REV. 194-198 (1996) (arguing that it is "incredible").
Barbara Hewson wrote, "A cynic's response might be: women (at any rate whilst pregnant
or in labour) are a species of inferior being, who are not the same as, and are therefore not
entitled to claim the same fundamental rights as men." Barbara Hewson, Woman's Rights
and Legal Wrongs, 146 NEw LAw JOURNAL 1385 (1996).
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protected from such serious consequences of her illness, it might have
been thought that the mental health legislation was deficient. In any
event, subsequent cases confirmed that the procedure and restraint to fa-
cilitate it would have been lawful at common law on the facts of Re C.
VI. AN ATTACK OF THE COMPETENCE OF PREGNANT WOMEN?
A. Determining the Patient's Best Interests
On June 21, 1996, two cases were heard by the same judge; both were
urgent, one so much so that the hearing of the other was interrupted for
the purpose.55 The more urgent case, Rochdale Healthcare NHS Trust v.
C,56 received the most rudimentary of hearings. The proceedings have
been graphically described by the lawyer for the hospital:
At 4:30 pm a call was made to our Manchester office indicating
that Mrs. C. was in labour in a trial of scar. Matters had not
gone well and in the opinion of the Consultant, her uterus at the
tile was rupturing. He believed that he could deliver an intact
baby within an hour, but if the matter were delayed further the
child would die and shortly after so would the mother. The call
waLs relayed to our London office and after taking direct instruc-
tions from the obstetrician we alerted the Official Solicitor who
to:Ld us that another case raising similar issues was at that time in
progress before Mr. Justice Johnson. We attended court and as-
certained that the other case was slightly less urgent in the opin-
ion of the attending consultants and the Court kindly broke off
to take our case and made an Order some 35 minutes after the
first contact with our Manchester office.57
The patient was not represented, and there was no amicus curiae. It is
unclear from the transcript of the judgment whether the patient had any
notice of the application. No formal evidence was before the court. The
solicitor merely reported what he had been told by telephone from the
hospital. This was to the effect that the patient objected to a Caesarean
section. because she had suffered backache and pain after a previous simi-
lar procedure. She said she would rather die than have a Caesarean sec-
tion again.58 There had been insufficient time to obtain a psychiatric
opinion on the patient's competence, but the consultant obstetrician be-
55. Rochdale Healthcare NHS Trust v. C [1997] 1 FCR 274. For an account of what
occurred, see HEMPSONS LAWYER 503 (3rd ed. 1996).
56. [1997] 1 FCR 274.
57. Id.
58. Id. For an account of what occurred, see HEMPSONS LAWYER 503 (3rd ed. 1996).
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lieved her to be fully competent. In an understandably short judgment,
the judge said he was acutely aware that the time for performing the op-
eration had almost elapsed, and that he had only the scantiest informa-
tion on which to act. However, he felt able to conclude that the patient
lacked the mental competence to make the relevant decision:
I accepted that view of the consultant obstetrician in relation to
the first two elements in the analysis of Wall J in Tameside
(supra) as to the capacity of the patient in the sense of her abil-
ity to comprehend and retain information and to believe such
information. However I concluded that the patient was in the
throes of labour with all that is involved in terms of pain and
emotional stress. I concluded that a patient who could, in those
circumstances, speak in terms which seemed to accept the inevi-
tability of her own death, was not a patient who was able prop-
erly to weigh up the considerations that arose so as to make any
valid decision, about anything of even the most trivial kind,
surely still less one which involved her own life.5 9
Accordingly, he found it was in the patient's best interests to undergo the
operation and made a declaration that such a procedure would be lawful.
In his judgment, delivered some days later, the judge recorded that he
had been informed that in fact by the time news of the declaration had
been transmitted to the hospital, the patient had changed her mind and
consented to the operation, which was performed successfully.
Despite the happy outcome, the judgment was the cause of some con-
cern. Not only had an order been made on an ex parte basis, but the
judge appeared to suggest in the passage quoted above that a woman "in
the throes of labour" was incapable of making any decision, however triv-
ial. Such a view is unlikely to appeal to labouring mothers or, indeed,
women in general. Indeed, there appeared to be no evidence, of even an
informal kind, to justify the finding. The judge seems to have been influ-
enced by a perceived irrationality in refusing a Caesarean section to save
a baby's life because of pain experienced. It seems that there may be a
variety of views on whether such a decision is inevitably irrational, but, in
any event, the general principle set out in Sidaway v. Board of Governors
of Royal Bethlem & Maudsley Hospitals6" precludes deciding competence
on the basis of the absence of good reasons for a decision.
Another case, decided on the same day, Norfolk and Norwich Health-
59. Id.
60. [1985] AC 871 (HL).
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care NUS Trust v. W,61 was arguably only slightly less controversial.
While the patient was not represented, the Official Solicitor provided
leading counsel to act as amicus. However, there was no formal written
or oral evidence and information was supplied to the court by counsel for
the hospital and a representative of the Official Solicitor, both having
spoken to the responsible consultants by telephone. It appeared that,
although the woman was in the second stage of labour which had ar-
rested, she denied she was pregnant. She had a history of psychiatric
treatment. The consultant wished to effect delivery by forceps, but
wanted authority to deliver by Caesarean section in the event that this
failed. He considered that the fetus would die if it was not delivered
within 11/4 hours of the time the application began. The attending consult-
ant psychiatrist considered that, although the patient was not suffering
from a mental disorder warranting detention under the Mental Health
Act 1983, she was incapable of balancing treatment information given to
her to make a choice. The judge could have found her incompetent on
that ground alone, but he chose to go further:
I held that although she was not suffering from a mental disor-
der within the meaning of the statute, she lacked the mental
competence to make a decision about the treatment that was
proposed because she was incapable of weighing up the consid-
erations that were involved. She was called upon to make that
decision at a time of acute emotional stress and physical pain in
the ordinary course of labour made even more difficult for her
because of her own particular mental history.62
He went on to find that the proposed method of delivery would be in her
best interests to prevent damage to her uterus, and the detrimental psy-
chological effects the death of the fetus would have on her. He also ruled
that at common law reasonable force could be used as a necessary inci-
dent of treatment, thus deciding the point left open in Tameside, on the
ground that it was in accordance with the doctrine of necessity enunciated
in Re -. 6
3
A hint at the reality of such decisions was given at the conclusion of the
judgment:
Throughout this judgment I have referred to 'the fetus' because
I wish to emphasise that the focus of my judicial attention was
upon the interests of the patient herself and not upon the inter-
61. [1996] 2 FLR 613.
62. Id. at 616 (emphasis supplied).
63. Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 (HL).
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ests of the fetus which she bore. However, the reality was that
the fetus was a fully formed child, capable of normal life if only
it could be delivered from the mother.64
Many would agree that a patient, who for reasons of mental disorder, 65
was incapable of believing she was pregnant in the circumstances of this
case, should in some way be protected from danger. However, the judge
in this case seems to have been influenced once again by a particular view
of the abilities of labouring women, and by the dangers posed to a viable
fetus. Furthermore, the court was prepared to make an order that effec-
tively authorised compulsory invasive surgery and restraint at a hearing
of which the patient appears to have had no notice, was unrepresented,
and no presentation of any formal evidence occurred.
Barbara Hewson suggested:
The assumption in the most recent cases seems to be that preg-
nant women are not really autonomous individuals entitled to
equal protection, but merely a subdivision of what the courts
once called infants and lunatics, incapable of making decisions
for themselves, for whom doctors and courts should be surro-
gate decision-makers. 6
B. Needle Phobias: Re L67
On December 5, 1996, the Family Division heard an application for a
declaration in Re L that it would be lawful to insert needles for the pur-
pose of anaesthesia, and to perform an emergency Caesarean section op-
eration on a woman in labour. The hearing took twenty-four minutes and
was attended by counsel for the hospital, and a representative of the Offi-
cial Solicitor. Again there was no formal evidence before the court, only
information relayed by counsel and the Official Solicitor who had ob-
tained it from the consultant by telephone. The patient, in her twenties,
was in labour at full term, but progress was obstructed. The consultant
considered that without intervention, deterioration in fetal health and
eventual death were inevitable. The patient wanted to have her child
64. Id. at 616.
65. Grubb, supra note 55, at 197. He states: "[lit is difficult to believe that her denial
of the obvious was based upon a difference of opinion or values rather than having a psy-
chiatric history." It is clearly important for the court to be satisfied that the inability is due
to mental disorder, rather than "the tendency most people have when undergoing medical
treatment to self-assess and then puzzle over the divergence between medical and self-
assessment." See B v. Croydon Health Authority (Thorpe J) [1994] 22 BMLR 13, 25.
66. Hewson, supra note 55, at 1386.
67. Family Division 5 December 1996 unreported: Kirkwood J.
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safely, but suffered from an extreme needle phobia and would not con-
sent to any injection such as would be necessary for an anaesthetic. The
alternative to inducing anaesthesia by gas inhalation carried a sixty per-
cent chance of causing the patient's death, and the anaesthetist consid-
ered this unacceptable.
It was reported that the consultant obstetrician considered the patient
to be incapable of weighing treatment information to make a choice. The
judge ruled that the patient lacked the capacity to make treatment deci-
sions on the ground that:
[HIer extreme needle phobia amounted to an involuntary com-
pulsion that disabled L from weighing treatment information in
the balance to make a choice. Indeed it was an affliction of a
psychological nature that compelled L against medical advice
with such force that her own life would be in serious peril.68
The judge was willing to make such a finding despite the absence of any
psychiatric evidence or even reported opinion. However, where an ur-
gent situation arises, it might be argued that it is better for the matter to
receive some form of judicial review than for doctors to proceed without
any external reference.
VII. A FINAL SOLUTION? RE NO69
The concerns raised by the previous cases were to some extent resolved
in Re MB. The case concerned a woman who was thirty-three weeks
pregnant with a footling breech presentation and an extreme needle pho-
bia. If normal labour was allowed to proceed, there was a considerable
risk of harm to the fetus, but little danger to the mother herself. She did
not oppose a Caesarean section as such, but adamantly refused to allow
any insertion of a needle for any purpose. In this case, the anaesthetist
was prepared to take the risks involved in the gas inhalation technique,
but the patient continually changed her mind as to whether she would
consent to this.7 °
The case was heard in circumstances of considerable urgency: an appli-
68. Id. at transcript p. 3.
69. [1997] 38 BMLR 175; [1997] Fam Law 542; [1997] 2 FCR 541; [1997] 2 FLR 426.
70. Her consultant psychiatrist's opinion was as follows:
Away from the need to undergo the procedure, I had no doubt at all that she fully
understood the need for a caesarian section and consented to it. However in the
final phase she got into a panic and said she could not go on. If she were calmed
down I thought she would consent to the procedure. At the moment of panic,
however, her fear dominated all.
Id. at transcript p. 6.
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cation was made by telephone to a Family Division judge, Hollis J be-
tween 9:25 and 9:55 pm, when he granted a declaration according to the
following terms:
It shall be lawful for 2 days from the date of this order, notwith-
standing the inability of [the patient] to consent thereto: (i) for
the [hospital's] responsible doctors to carry out such treatment
as may in their opinion be necessary for the purposes of the
[patient's] present labour, including, if necessary, caesarian sec-
tion, including the insertion of needles for the purposes of intra-
venous infusions and anaesthesia; (ii) for reasonable force to be
used in the course of such treatment; (iii) generally to furnish
such treatment and nursing care as may be appropriate to en-
sure that the [patient] suffers the least distress and retains the
greatest dignity.7 '
The patient was represented by counsel who had some opportunity to
take instructions from her, if only by telephone. The Official Solicitor's
representative was present as amicus. No formal evidence was available,
and as in previous cases, information gleaned by counsel for both parties
was relayed by telephone to the judge.
Hollis J found that she lacked the mental capacity to make treatment
decisions. An appeal was immediately launched against the decision, and
a full Court of Appeal convened to hear it in open court at 11:00 pm The
hearing concluded at 1:00 am the following morning with the dismissal of
the appeal. As this was the first occasion on which a case of this type had
been before the Court of Appeal, their reserved judgment addressed
many of the problems seen above. The Court made several rulings that
dealt with capacity, use of reasonable force, the interests of the fetus, and
proper procedure.
It was emphasised that every adult is presumed to have the capacity to
make decisions about treatment unless and until that presumption is re-
butted, and that a competent person is entitled to make a decision:
[F]or religious reasons, other reasons, for rational or irrational
reasons or for no reason at all, choose not to have medical inter-
vention, even though the consequences may be the death or se-
rious handicap of the child she bears, or her own death. In that
event the courts do not have the jurisdiction to declare medical
intervention lawful and the question of her own best interests
objectively considered does not arise.
The irrationality that the competent patient was entitled to indulge in was
71. Id. at transcript p. 7.
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very wide ranging: "a decision so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his
mind tu the question to be decided could have arrived at it." However,
the Court suggested that:
Although it might be thought that irrationality sits uneasily with
competence to decide, panic, indecisiveness and irrationality in
themselves do not as such amount to incompetence, but they
may be symptoms or evidence of incompetence. The graver the
consequences of the decision, the commensurately greater the
level of competence required to take the decision.
The Court approved of the Re C test described above, but added the gloss
that temporary factors, such as confusion, shock, fatigue, pain, drugs, or
panic induced by fear might destroy or erode capacity. It was emphasised
that careful examination of the evidence was required to determine
whether fear had destroyed capacity, as opposed to being a rational rea-
son for refusal. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court held that
the patient had lost her capacity by reason of her needle phobia dominat-
ing her thinking.72
The Court affirmed previous decisions on the reasonable use of force
and held that reasonable force could be used where necessary to the best
interests of the patient. The Court acknowledged that the issue may need
to be examined in greater depth on a future occasion.
After a thorough consideration of statutes and case law, including
human rights cases and American authorities,7 3 it was emphatically held
that there was no jurisdiction at common law to declare nonconsensual
medical intervention to be lawful to protect the interests of the unborn
child:
The law is, in our judgment, clear that a competent woman who
72. By the time the Court of Appeal delivered their reserved judgment, affidavit evi-
dence verifying the information given at the hearing had been filed.
73. Re T (Adult: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1993] Fain 95; Paton v. British Preg-
nancy Advisory Service [1979] QB 276; C v. S [1989] QB 135; Burton v. Islington Health
Authority [1993] QB 204; Attorney-General's Reference No 3 [1996] 1 Cr App R 351; Villar
v. Gilbey [1907] AC 139; Offences against the Person Act 1861 section 58; Abortion Act
1967; Ccngenital Disabilities Act 1976; Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of
German), [1977] 3 EHRR 244; Paton v. United Kingdom [1977] 3 EHRR 408; H v. Norway
(1990) (Commission case no 17004/90, unreported); Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v.
Ireland 11992] 15 EHRR 244; Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital Authority,
201 A.2. 537 (N.J. 1964); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth. 274 S.E.2d 457
(Ga. 1981); Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985); In re AC, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990), 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987); In re Baby Boy Doe,
632 N.E.2d 326 (Il. App. Ct. 1994).
1998]
386 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:365
has the capacity to decide may, for religious reasons, other rea-
sons, or nor no reasons at all, choose not to have medical inter-
vention, even though ... the consequence may be the death or
serious handicap of the child she bears or her own death. She
may refuse to consent to the anaesthesia injection in the full
knowledge that her decision may significantly reduce the chance
of her unborn child being born alive. The fetus up to the mo-
ment of birth does not have any separate interests capable of
being taken into account when a court has to consider an appli-
cation for a declaration in respect of a caesarian section
operation.74
Thus, the court dealt a mortal blow to the validity of Re S as an authority
and emphatically restored the primacy of the competent adult woman's
autonomy, while seeking to maintain a level of protection for those who
are incapable of making a decision for themselves.
Finally, the court offered procedural guidelines. While it was said that
the court was unlikely to entertain an application for a declaration of this
type unless capacity was in issue, it was suggested that "for the time being
at least" doctors should seek a ruling on the issue of competence. It was
unclear whether this related only to cases where there was a dispute on
that issue. It was made clear that it was highly desirable for this type of
case to be brought as soon as a potential problem was identified, rather
than at the last desperate minute, and that the hearing should be inter
partes with the mother being represented in all cases if she wished to be.
It was also preferable for evidence on competence to be given by a
psychiatrist.
A. Is the Law Now in a Satisfactory State?
Re MB has clarified the law in the most controversial area, namely the
right of the competent woman to determine what is done with her own
body, avowedly aligning the underlining principles in English law with
those applied in the American courts. 75 It has provided further guidance
on when obstetric treatment decision cases should be brought before the
court, and has discouraged unjustified urgent applications made ex parte
and without proper evidence. 76 However, there are a number of matters
74. [1997] 38 BMLR 175; [1997] Fam Law 542; [1997] 2 FCR 541; [1997] 2 FLR 426;
transcript p. 28.
75. See In re AC, 573 A.2d at 1237; In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d. at 366.
76. This has undoubtedly had an effect. The writer has professional experience with
one subsequent ex parte application in which the judge refused to make any ruling because
there was no evidence of urgency requiring an immediate decision.
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that remain unclear and where potentially serious threats to female au-
tonomy lurk.
1. The Judicial Dilemma
It may be argued that the motivating factor in some of the more con-
trovers ial decisions has been the understandable desire on the part of
humane judges to err on the side of saving life when faced with an ex-
treme urgency with no real opportunity to study complex case law or evi-
dence in the face of an apparently irrational decision. This was clearly
impliec by Sir Stephen Brown P in his lecture referring to Re S:
Now the academics have said that it was utterly wrong, it
shouldn't have been done ex parte and it was a gross infringe-
ment of the rights of the mother. The consultant wrote me a
letter afterwards . . . he said almost the same thing had hap-
pened with her second pregnancy, but somehow the Lord 'had
provided' and that gave her the strength, as it were, and the pur-
pose to go on in this occasion. But he made this remark at the
end of the letter: 'It would have been very sad: she had two
young children at home.' Well these are the human problems.
There are legal problems. It would be splendid to have time to
debate them in the calm of the Court of Appeal, if one had time,
or even more in the House of Lords. But these are the
problems which face doctors and which had faced us .... I am
su:re it is perhaps a good thing that the lady is able to continue
looking after her children. That is the human aspect.77
Johnson J, in his judgment in the Rochdale case,7 8 recorded that after the
event he was informed that the patient had changed her mind and given
her consent to the procedure; the operation had been successful, and both
mother and baby were doing well. Understandably, he was reassured
that he had differed from the psychiatrist on the question of competence.
He concluded his judgment by saying "In the words of [the hospital's
solicitor] 'this story may show that justice is more accessible than
psychiatry."'
Family Division judges typically exercise the wardship jurisdiction to
protect children, even from themselves, but in this area they are expected
to put aside their impression of right and wrong and allow apparently
irrational decisions to lead to death. In such circumstances, and in the
77. Matters of Life and Death, supra note 30, at 61.
78. [1997] 1 FCR 274.
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absence of any legislative guidance, it would not be surprising if they
strained to find a means of avoiding such a consequence.
2. Capacity
Thorpe J's three-stage test of capacity, as elaborated in Re MB, is not
without its problems. In particular, it allows a degree of uncertainty in
relation to the effect of temporary conditions such as panic and pain,
which may tempt a judge concerned to protect fetal life against an appar-
ently irrational decision to err on the side of finding incompetence. Fear,
pain, and panic are sensations experienced by many if not most hospital
patients: are they to be in danger of being found incompetent because
they express disagreement with their doctors, but perhaps are in too
much pain to express their reasons clearly? If personal autonomy is the
guiding principal, why should a perfectly normal human experience, un-
tainted by mental disorder, render a person obliged to accept the deci-
sions of others? If the wishes of an otherwise competent person in pain
are to be ignored, should this not be discussed with him or her before that
stage has been reached so that his wishes for the future are ascertained?
3. Procedure
It is suggested that the current procedure available to the English
courts is profoundly unsatisfactory. A declaration that treatment pro-
posed by the doctor is lawful is not a satisfactory substitute for a decision
taken by or on behalf of the patient by a proxy decision maker, whether it
is a guardian or the court. This is particularly so if a declaration must be
granted when the doctor's opinion is consistent with a responsible and
competent body of professional opinion, even if another such body of
opinion holds a different view. The declaration that is then granted may
depend on which body of opinion happens to have control of the care of
the patient.79
4. A Solution?
One or both of two things should be done. First, a wardship or guardi-
anship jurisdiction should be restored to the courts, so that judges can
seek to protect fully the rights of those before it, as is done in many state
jurisdictions in the United States. Second, Parliament should provide leg-
79. In fact, the English courts are probably prepared to decide between two reason-
able proposals in this type of case. For example, see Re S (Patient: Court's Jurisdiction)
[1995] 3 All ER 290.
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islative guidance in connection with what, if any, recognition should be
afforded to a fetus. This is a community issue that the judiciary is not
inherently qualified to determine. Parliament has demonstrated repeat-
edly its ability and willingness to enter this arena,8" and should do so
again.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This series of cases demonstrates some of the strengths and weaknesses
of judge-made law. Through a legislative omission, a jurisdiction to pro-
tect the mentally incompetent was removed, leaving no apparent means
for court intervention in treatment decision making. The real danger of
leaving such patients in a worse position than those able to make deci-
sions for themselves was reduced by the introduction of the declaratory
jurisdiction to enable a review of doctors' decisions to take place. It is
strongly arguable that the legislature should introduce a more compre-
hensive system to enable proxy decision makers to be appointed, but in
the absence of this, it might be thought that the present jurisdiction is
better than nothing. Whether the House of Lords was correct to reject
the opportunity to introduce transatlantic concepts of substituted judg-
ment is a matter for debate. Of more concern has been the application by
judges of values that do not necessarily attract universal support in a field
where, at the very least, a variety of views is possible. An understandable
desire to save life in circumstances where many might think it is being
endangered unjustifiably by irrational decisions has arguably led to inva-
sions of civil rights, the modification of which should only be the province
of Parliament rather than the judiciary, in a jurisdiction where the courts
are not as yet granted a role similar to the United States Supreme Court.
80. Ns with the ABORTION AcT 1967 and the HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOL-
oGY Acr 1990.
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